Global security outlook

The global security outlook is challenging.
Join our webinar with Admiral Lord West sharing his views on the state of the world.

Summary of Speech

I’m here to present a strategic analysis of global security threats. Which is by no means straightforward, given the speed with which events are unfolding at this point in time. We have conflict in Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon, upheaval in Syria, attacks in Yemen affecting global shipping routes. The first active service I saw was in Aden, so sometimes it feels that things don’t change much. Escalation between Iran and Israel, the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, ongoing fragility in the Horn of Africa and the problem of lawlessness across the whole of the Sahel down into Nigeria. The latter is exacerbated by the withdrawal of the French military and the growing presence of Russia’s Wagner group. Drugs are trafficked from South America to Mauritania and then on up through the Sahara.

Closer to home in Europe, Russia is getting involved to an uncomfortable degree in Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Georgia and I see this as a problem that will come back to bite us. Putin has never been inclined to accept the collapse of the Soviet Union and believes these places should be in his sphere of influence. The fact that he may feel that he’s gained something in Ukraine will only encourage him elsewhere.

Then there is Afghanistan, now run by the Taliban, who are increasingly getting into bed with terrorist organisations. Our initial aim in going to Afghanistan post 9/11 was because they were training huge numbers of Al Q’aeda terrorists. There were some huge training camps, but we had some success by going in hard and pushing them out of their territory. At that stage, we should have settled and got out, threatening to return only if terrorist training was ramped up again. But we didn’t, and I think that will come to be seen as a huge mistake. Many of the displaced terrorists ended up in Pakistan, which itself is another unstable state.
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Moving further east we have China, making spurious territorial claims in the South China Sea and sabre-rattling over Taiwan, we have North Korea with its unpredictable nuclear status, Russia manoeuvring in the Arctic. All in all, we are in a dangerous world.

I held the position of the UK’s first Cyber minister, and produced our first cyber strategy back in 2008. The concept of cyber attacks and cyber warfare were distant and misunderstood but having a formal strategy (which we produced ahead of the Americans) has made a huge difference as time as gone on. It’s a problem that grows exponentially and could disrupt the flow of money, shipping, transport links. We rely on the relatively weak signals of satellites for much of this, whereas China and Russia have land-based technology that can maintain their signals with greater strength. Attacks on undersea cables are increasing and with Britain being an island, we are also reliant on physical connections to bring us energy such as gas from Norway, and therefore more vulnerable.

Essentially, Russia is already waging a war of sorts with us. Putin has carried out operations on British soil, in France, in Estonia and there is a constant barrage of cyber attacks from Russian state entities.  In spite of signing a treaty in 2002 recognising Ukraine’s borders, he invaded the Crimea in 2014 and because repercussions were minimal, it gave him confidence to move on Kiev. Which proved a major misjudgement. But being unable to accept that he is wrong, he is doubling down and losing huge numbers of soldiers in the process. Notwithstanding, the Russian economy is surviving thanks to trade with India and China. China has been supplying them with equipment and Xi Jin Ping has generally been supportive. I would say that Russia needs to be cautious in that relationship, however. One may note that it has only really ever been successfully invaded from the east.

If Ukraine can hold out in this terrible war of attrition for another year, then Russia will be facing a perfect storm. In terms of manpower, having already turned to North Korea, and half-emptied its prisons, some kind of conscription may well be needed. The supply of weapons from China and Iran is likely to slow down as the financial impact becomes too much for them to maintain. It will be interesting to see whether Trump will keep his promise about ending the war in a day – I suspect he will be instrumental. If he does, it will most likely involve a ceasefire, a peace treaty and the ceding of land to Russia.

The aftermath would be problematic, as NATO membership for Ukraine would be intolerable for Russia, and therefore some kind of American or Western security guarantee would have to be put in place meaning more defence spending for Europe. Russia is on a war-footing, spending 40% of GDP on defence. By contrast Europe is arguing about spending 2.5%.

Putin has threatened nuclear escalation and the country is sitting on approximately 5,000 warheads. But intelligence would suggest that among senior security personnel, not everyone in Russia is on board. And Xi Jin Ping has made it clear that nuclear engagement is to be avoided at all costs. There was a recent report about China building up its nuclear capability fast, but I don’t think the Chinese like the thought of nuclear warfare.

If we turn to focus on the Middle East, I don't think a war between Israel and Iran is imminent. Albeit that it would suit Netanyahu because then the US would have to get involved. But having studied Iran for many years in my defence intelligence role, regime survival is the most important thing to them and a war would almost certainly bring about the regime’s defeat. I don’t think Iran knew much of the Hamas attack of 7th October. They have the capability to produce a nuclear weapon in the time-frame of a couple of months but at present are not opting to do so. The war between Israel and Palestine however will most likely continue in some form or other as it has done since 1948 and that is a terrible shame.

As to whether China will ever invade Taiwan, I would think it unlikely unless something dramatic changes in Taiwan politically, and an overt drive for independence is asserted. An invasion of Taiwan would be a risky military endeavour, and China doesn’t like war because it is unpredictable. Putin’s failure to achieve a swift victory in Ukraine is but further evidence of this. Taiwan is also a manufacturer of chips in huge volumes, and with the economic woes currently besetting China, disrupting this could be harmful. The Belt and Road initiative is more instructive of the way that China likes to operate. Infrastructure is built in countries all round the world, leaving them owing China a huge amount of money which then prompts the yielding of land and strategic bases by way of exchange. This tactic is currently in the spotlight in the Chagos islands, and China’s involvement in Mauritius.

China has tried to dominate the global supply of rare minerals and raw materials, something we need to guard against when we think of who we source from, and it is also trying to control the £7.5m worth of trade that passes through the South China Sea each year. Sending a carrier to the region is the right things to do, not least because it is a show of support for the Americans.

​It cannot always be a one-way street. Post-war, the US has supported us in Europe and Trump has the grounds to put it to us that if we don’t pay enough money, we cannot look to them to look after us. Spending on our own defence is an imperative. The coalition government of 2010 cut our military by a third. When I joined the Navy there were about 139 destroyers and escorts. By the time we fought in Falklands there were 75 and we lost 8 of them. We now have 15. If we were to lose another 8 in combat today, we would have 7 left. The military has been hollowed out. Along with many other European nations, it is clear that not enough money has been spent, and learning lessons from the war in Ukraine, it is vital that defence is taken seriously now.  ​