In this webinar, we are honoured to be joined by Steve Webb, Partner at LCP and former Pensions Minister 2010-15 overseeing "Freedoms & Choice". Steve will discuss his recently co-authored paper for LCP titled ""The Flex First, Fix Later" pension - is this this the future of retirement?" and earlier paper "Is there a right time to buy an annuity?"
Thank you so much to all the UK advisers who voted for us in these upcoming awards!
Elston was one of the early pioneers (back in 2018!) of adviser-defined Custom mandates for DFMs and Advisers, and we are glad the idea has caught on! We aim to continue to deliver, helping adviser to support their clients achieve great investment outcomes at great value for money. So we are delighted that Elston Portfolio Management - which powers both our ready-made and Custom MPS services - is on the shortlist in each of the 6 categories announced today.... Best Reporting Best Value for Money Most Satisfactory Investment Outcome Best Communication in a Crisis Most Useful Digital Interface Best Availability of Sustainable Investment Strategies After being honoured to win 7 out of 12 categories in 2024, it wd be a statistical stretch to achieve that again in an ever widening, highly competitive field. But here's hoping! You can see the full shortlist here.
The UK’s new Sustainable Disclosure Requirements (SDR) aim to transform sustainable investing by providing clearer fund labelling that obliges greater accountability. Formulated by the FCA, the new regulations have been designed to combat “greenwashing,” ie, marketing investments as sustainable without sufficient evidence. The more clearly-defined standards set out in the SDRs seek to ensure that investors can have greater confidence in ESG funds' sustainability claims. There is a corollary effect, however, which is that meeting the stringent SDR standards requires significant input from a compliance perspective, meaning increased costs for fund managers. This in turn appears to be deterring many of them from seeking SDR certification, thereby reducing product availability for both institutional and retail investors alike. What are the SDR labels?The SDRs introduce stricter guidelines and mechanisms by which to distinguish funds according to their sustainability goals. The new labels, which include "Sustainability Focus", "Sustainability Impact", “Sustainability Improvers” and “Sustainability Mixed Goals” are all part of an effort to ensure that investors can gain access to the information they require in order to make meaningful capital allocation decisions in line with sustainability goals. The package of measures includes investment labels, naming and marketing rules, an anti-greenwashing rule for all FCA-authorised businesses and a set of disclosure rules. Challenges for ProvidersKey to the successful implementation of SDRs is the government’s Green Taxonomy, an agreed scheme of classification that will underpin the definitions within the regulatory framework. Unfortunately, it has yet to be finalised by the government, leaving businesses vulnerable to misinterpretation when seeking to comply. Where the UK has SDRs, Europe has the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulations (SFDR), which likewise seek to counter greenwashing by promoting transparency. However, where the SDRs set out quite a granular system of categorisation and promote active engagement and results, SFDRs relate to the promotion of sustainable objectives and are relatively less onerous to adhere to. The regulatory differential could lead to various outcomes. Potentially, active fund managers in the UK will be afforded greater strategic opportunities because they can boast of higher sustainable standards for their investments. However, the increased cost involved in complying with SDRs vs. SFDRs may push providers to register sustainable products in Europe rather than the UK, leading to an exodus of funds and a diminished pool of sustainable investments to choose from. The stringent documentation requirements of the SDRs present challenges for smaller ESG funds, which must provide detailed proof of compliance with sustainability goals. Many smaller funds are unlikely to have the infrastructure to manage these complex reporting demands efficiently, obliging further investment in technology and/or workforce the cost of which is likely to be passed on to investors through higher fees. Reducing choiceThere has not been wholesale adoption of the SDRs by the large fund houses. Major firms like Abrdn and Invesco have delayed applying SDR labels such as ‘impact’ and ‘improvers,’ reflecting the industry-wide struggle to meet the FCA’s standards in time. As of July 2024, when the labels were first available, only a few of the largest fund houses had implemented them despite the looming deadlines. Only about 300 UK funds are expected to apply for the SDR labels by the end of the year. Currently, of the 373 funds that classify themselves under an ESG-related label, approximately 30 have obtained an SDR label. Impact on low-cost fundsOne other corollary of the introduction of the SDRs is that they have had a particularly noticeable impact on index funds carrying the sustainable label, the great majority of which can no longer refer to themselves as such. MSCI is one of the largest ESG index providers in the industry with an offering of over a thousand ESG-labelled indices. However it has recently come under fire for greenwashing, with some critics arguing that its ESG ratings lack depth, focusing more on exclusionary screens rather than ensuring that sustainability objectives are actively met. It was these concerns in particular that motivated the FCA to introduce the stricter labelling requirements of the SDR. MSCI is having to remove ‘ESG’ from the names of over 100 of its indices in order to comply with updated fund naming guidelines, a change that will impact a considerable proportion of the sustainable fund market. ESG investments, especially those linked to indices like the MSCI ESG Leaders and Socially Responsible Investment series, have experienced enormous growth globally in recent years. In the UK alone, total assets in sustainable funds have increased from under £20 billion five years ago to over £90 billion today, driven by increasing demand from retail and institutional investors seeking to align their portfolios with environmental and social goals. This momentum is threatened by the changes implemented by the FCA in the SDR SummaryWhile the SDR rules are designed to combat greenwashing and enhance the quality of information available to investors, the knock-on effect is that fewer ESG products are available in the market, and those that are come at a significantly higher cost to investors. The central question remains: is there a better balance to be found between ensuring genuine ESG credentials and maintaining a diverse and burgeoning product universe? Is it more detrimental in the long run to undermine the momentum of fund flows into sustainable investments than to seek to enforce rigorously high standards? Time will tell if the SDRs will prove successful or whether the FCA has raised barriers to entry unfeasibly high.
Andrea Acimovic Head of ESG Research, Elston Consulting In this article for Professional Adviser, Hoshang Daroga explores what makes the US stock market exceptional and whether its outperformance is sustainable.
Read the full article What is Deepseek?
The new Chinese AI tool is the most downloaded app in the US and claims to be able to operate quicker and more cheaply than Chat GPT. By requiring fewer chips and smaller server farms, DeepSeek can deliver its AI generated results, which incorporates self-corrective learning, at lower cost. The arrival of DeepSeek in the AI field creates a challenge to Chat GPT and also means more could potentially be done with fewer advanced chips. The DeepSeek app is free, and its code is open source, which means companies in the US can easily create similar copycat versions of it. Its AI model is called R1 which has some 670 billion parameters, making it the largest open-source LLM (large language model) yet. The R1 is unlike traditional models that immediately generate responses. The R1 are trained to think extensively before answering. Its approach is similar to how a human carefully considers a complex problem before answering it. The method is known as test-time compute and requires the model to spend up to minutes working through its chain of thought. The company estimates it has cost $6 million to train the model compared to other AI models which cost over a $100 million each. The app challenges the notion that the only way of building better AI models is by spending large amounts of money buying high powered processing chips. What happened to NVidia stock? Lower potential demand for chips has led to a rapid sell-off in NVidia shares, which declined -17% in 1 day on 27th January 2025. Because of NVidia - and the broader technology sector's high exposure within the S&P 500 this led to a US equity market sell off, dragging down market-cap weighted world equity indices too. Other stocks which suffered similar down moves were Oracle (-13.79%), Cisco (-5.06%), Broadcom (-17.40%). These companies along with Nvidia provide important components in building data centers and digital infrastructure to support training AI models. NVidia released a statement saying "DeepSeek’s work illustrates how new models can be created using that technique, leveraging widely-available models and compute that is fully export control compliant." While President Trump said the breakthrough in technology is a positive for America and that it is a wake-up call for US tech firms to not rest on their laurels. Elevated concentration risk in the US equity market is well-documented and one of the reasons we recommend advisers we work with to balance traditional S&P500 market-cap weighted exposure (which was down -1.46%) with S&P500 Equal-Weighted exposure (which was up +0.03%), and also for active selections within Sectors and Styles. How much NVidia is in a portfolio? For a balanced, well diversified portfolio built with funds, direct exposure to NVidia should not be more than 2% or so. This reflects the importance of diversifying away from stock-specific "idiosyncratic" risk. Creative disruption requires diversification As with any paradigm shift, it's hard to identify clear-cut winners in advance. We welcome the AI revolution as a broader technological innovation theme to consider within portfolios. But this episode emphasises the value of having a diversified approach. Cashflow modelling is useful for financial planning at any stage, but essential for decumulation and retirement income advice.
How to make cashflow modelling assumptions How can advisers make cashflow modelling assumptions that are robust and reliable? It's important that financial adviser business have robust cashflow modelling assumptions. We explore the key variables Growth rates: we propose using SMPI rates from the FRC aligned to the recommended portfolio solution Inflation rate: we propose using FRC assumptions Cash rates: we propose using an average cash rate. Costs and charges: we propose using the total cost and charges figure of the recommended solution. We will be updating this with additional information shortly.
The global security outlook is challenging.
Join our webinar with Admiral Lord West sharing his views on the state of the world. Follow us on Linked In for latest updates Subscribe to our weekly newsletter to get all our insights to your inbox (for UK financial advisers only) [5 min read, open as pdf]
Pension providers use Statutory Money Purchase Illustration (SMPI) rates to illustrate the potential return on a pension portfolio. Mandated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the methodology behind SMPI is overseen by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). While the rates theoretically derive from capital market assumptions, after extensive consultation in 2023, the FRC evolved the approach. The key changes are 1) there are now four growth rates defined, rather than three, and 2) the growth rates are linked to volatility. What are the implications for advisers? Financial advisers have to use an assumed growth rate when undertaking any kind of cash-flow planning. Whilst financial advisers are not obliged to use the same rates as a pension provider, we consider it good practice to use them in cashflow modelling assumptions so that growth rates are 1) reasonable, 2) consistent with regulatory guidance for pension providers and 3) evidence-based. Whilst growth rate assumptions are never certain and assumptions are open to challenge, the fact that there are now volatility bands for each SMPI rate means advisers can apply rates that map to an asset allocation framework, thereby de-risking their growth rate assumptions by relying on the FRC approach. SMPI rate history Since April 2024, the SMPI rates are 2%, 4%, 6% and 7% for volatility Groups 1,2,3 and 4 respectively. This was a change from 1%, 4%, 5% and 7% from October 2023. For the decade prior to then, the SMPI rates were 2%, 5%, and 8% for the Lower, Intermediate and Higher Rate. The evolution of regulatory SMPI is summarised in the chart. As the methodology considers capital market returns and risk premia, the reduction in rates was linked to compressed yield following the financial crisis (plotted with spot gilt yields and rolling 10-year gilt yields for reference). What is the methodology to setting the rates A huge amount of asset class performance analysis around long-run gilts returns and risk premia was conducted by PWC in March 2012 to assist the FCA and the FRC in their review of statutory projection rates. From 2003 to 2012, these rates were 5%, 7% and 9% for the lower, intermediate and higher growth rates. Broadly speaking this inherently represented a “risk free” bond portfolio of 5%, an all-equity portfolio of 9% (assuming 4% equity risk premium), and a balanced multi-asset portfolio in the middle of 7%. The PWC study of 2012 (when gilt yields were suppressed following the financial crisis) supported the FCA decision to reduce the rates to 2%, 5% and 8%. What does the new methodology look like and how has it been calculated? In addition to creating a new low fourth rate, and tweaking the other rates, the SMPI rates are now also been defined by 5-year volatility bands (across 4 bands), which is a similar (and more pragmatic) methodology to ESMA SRRI definitions (7 bands). Both the FRC and ESMA methodologies face the challenge of using static volatility bands (when volatility is itself dynamic), but introducing the linkage between risk and return is good progress and consistent with theory and practice. The volatility bands used by the FRC to create the groups are: Group 1: 0-5% volatility Group 2: 5-10% volatility Group 3: 10-15% volatility Group 4: >15% volatility Based on the FRC’s technical analysis[1] (looking at the median volatility of 1,075 pension funds over rolling 5-year periods), Group 1 volatility (0-5%) would capture money market funds, Group 2 volatility would capture bond funds, Group 3 would capture multi-asset funds, and Group 4 would capture equity funds (based on an analysis of pension funds). By looking at the mid-point of those volatility bands, it is now possible to link SMPI returns with volatility assumptions to create a traditional capital markets framework. The SMPI risk-return is summarised below. What could FRC do to improve the methodology?
Use index, not fund data The current volatility bands are based on pension fund performance aggregates for different asset classes. This requires data aggregation and inherently captures how those funds are managed, not just their asset classes. We think a potential improvement would be to use index data for each asset class and derive SMPI rates that are expressly linked to asset allocations, rather than samples of funds. This would enable consultants and scheme providers to model the SMPI rate of different asset allocation strategies and be a more useful assumption for cashflow modelling tools. Relative, not absolute, volatility bands The other drawback, in our view, is using absolute volatility bands. Because market volatility is itself volatile, a “balanced” 60/40 mandate could be >10% for one 5-year period and <10% for another 5-year period. The risk classification of KIID documentation has the same problem. We think “relative risk” is more useful. This is where a portfolio can be defined as having x% of Global Equity volatility. Relative risk is relatively stable as it captures fluctuations in the level of volatility over any 5-year period. By contrast absolute risk cannot. Conclusion Growth rates in pensions illustrations are highly governed by the FCA and FRC. By contrast there are no constraints on what financial advisers use as illustration rates in cashflow models. We think it prudent that advisers use the FRC growth rates in their cashflow planning tools. [1] https://media.frc.org.uk/documents/AS_TM1_-_Accumulation_Rate_Assumptions.pdf
The Investment Trust sector has been under pressure for the last few years. Investment Trusts that invest in liquid public overseas equities are compared to lower cost index fund and ETFs. Investment Trusts that invest in liquid public UK equities – likewise, but with the additional challenge of a general deallocation from UK equities impacting flows. Finally, Investment Trusts that invest in property and other real assets such as wind farms and infrastructure have been pressured by rising borrowing costs that also impact valuations. Throw into the mix an extensive debate around cost disclosures[1], a public boardroom bust up at Scottish Mortgage[2] and accusations that the industry is too “cosy” with independent boards being independent in name only but in reality very rarely challenging or replacing sponsoring investment managers. This has created a perfect storm for Investment Trusts where the lack of demand has led to persistent discounts. Vulnerable to an attack As the sector has not got its house in order pre-emptively, sharks are now circling in the shape of an activist US hedge fund, Saba Capital, that has built up stakes in 7 investment trusts. They are now requisitioning shareholder meetings to oust each Trust board and install their own candidates as board members and transfer the investment management contracts to Saba. If they are successful it’s a neat way of getting hold of almost £4bn of UK retail assets and collecting management fees on the same. In this respect, their strategy (however presented) is not without self interest. Who are Saba Capital Management? Saba Capital Management is a US based hedge fund specialising in arbitrage. It also manages US-based investment trusts. We agree with the diagnosis We agree with Saba’s diagnosis of the failings of some of the Investment Trusts. We also agree with the key tenets of how boards should act to deliver value to shareholder. Based on Saba’s own proposal[3], this would be to:
We disagree with the cure However we disagree with Saba’s self-interested proposal to take over these Trusts with just two of its own appointees to each board. From the outside, this looks like an asset grab in a sector that has done too little to address its own problems. It would be preferable for Investment Trust boards to wake up and force change themselves, rather than wait to have it forced on them by self-interested third party. Ironically, it may take this abrasive battle to stimulate change in the sector. What happens next? In the end it will be up to retail investors to vote their shares. The risk is that investor apathy and or the technological barrier to exercising a vote via retail platforms (another area of unfinished business that has been neglected too long) means that Saba If Saba do win, it will vindicate their activist approach and a sorry indictment that the Investment Trust sector didn’t get its house in order earlier. So either way it’s hopefully it’s catalyst for reform and increased discipline, transparency and true independence in the Investment Trust sector. Why do investement trusts trade at a discount The share price of an investment trust can be at a wide premium or wide discount to their NAV, for the following reasons: 1) because there is low or shrinking demand for the shares. As investment trusts are closed-ended funds, the premium or discount reflects the direction of supply and demand of shares. For an investment trust, the premium or discount to NAV is primarily a function of demand. When demand is very high, the share price can be at a premium. When demand is very low, the share price can be at a discount. 2) because the fund holds some hard-to-value or periodically valued investments. Assets such as physical property or infrastructure projects, a discount to NAV can reflect a lack of confidence in the NAV attributed to those assets. For example, when interest rates rose dramatically which would force a reduction in the value of a property portfolio, the market may have applied a greater discount to NAV more quickly, than the NAV would be reviewed. 3) because there is no catalyst to drive a re-rating. With no catalyst or a valuation re-rating such as a capital event (capital distribution, share buyback, change in dividend policy), discounts can persist. Why do investment trust discounts narrow? Discounts can narrow for three reasons: Firstly, if there is high or growing demand for the shares. Secondly, where there is potential for a capital event. Finally, assuming markets are efficient, when there is a change in the outlook for net returns over time. Furthermore, where an investment trust invests entirely in liquid publicly traded securities, this means the NAV can be clearly evaluated, creates scope for “arbitrages” – buying or selling the Investment Trust relative to its underlying holdings. This helps keeps premiums/discounts narrow. Why do investment management fees matter The investment management fee is typically applied to the NAV (a few trusts are moving to management fee being applied to share price to align interests better with shareholders). Investment trust fees matter as they consume a portion of the trust's NAV. For two investment trusts with an identical basket of underlying assets, an investment trust with high fees as a % of NAV will underperform an investment trust with low fees as % of NAV, other things being equal. What is the difference between a fund, an ETF and an Investment Trust?
Conclusion The investment trust sector needs reform. We would prefer the sector to reform itself. [1] some want Investment Trusts to be treated as operating companies and have their running costs excluded from fund-of-fund OCFs. Other wanting Investment Trusts to continue to be treated as other publicly listed retail funds (ETFs), and ensure their running costs continue to be included in fund-of-fund OCFs to maintain a level playing field. We are in the latter camp. To bring nuance to the debate, we think there should be differentiated treatment between Investment Trusts that invest predominantly in publicly listed securities, and those that invest predominantly in real assets (property, infrastructure etc). [2] https://www.ft.com/content/84c6442c-4108-4094-b94d-8585517da00a [3] https://www.mindthegap-uktrusts.com/ Subscribe to our weekly newsletter to get all our insights to your inbox (for UK financial advisers only)
[5 min read, open as pdf] Macro factors: growth, inflation and rates
The three key macro drivers that impact markets are Growth (“G”), Inflation (“I”), and interest Rates (“R”) the policy rates set by the Central Bank. Every economic data release is relevant in as much as what it means for the direction of these three key macro drivers. Monitoring these macro factors The chart shows the recent evolution of these three macro factors for the UK. What about other macro factors? Other key macro factors that impact markets include Sovereign Risk (e.g. higher risk premia for Emerging Markets), Credit Risk (higher risk premia for lower quality debt) and Liquidity Risk (higher rewarded return for less liquid investments). Macro factors affect all asset classes Macro factors impact equities and bonds alike. Macro factors impact the risk premia (and hence return expectations) on different asset classes. As these premia shift, so do expected returns. For example, corporate bonds are impacted by interest rates premium, inflation risk premium and credit premium. Small cap equities are impacted by interest rate premium, inflation risk premium, growth premium and liquidity premium. Macro factors are inter-related Macro factors are inter-related. In the text books, when economic growth is strong inflation pressure builds. Interest rates are raised to contain inflation. When interest rates fall, that can stimulate growth. In reality, it can be more complicated (and has been). The relationship between macro factors is key, as a read of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee minutes will show. Why we believe in an adaptive approach A static-allocation “cruise-control” portfolio had worked well until the bond market dislocation of 2022 driven by the inflation and rate-hike shock. But as markets don’t stand still, nor should portfolios, in our view. We believe in an adaptive approach adaptive approach to navigate market risks, rather than leaving portfolios in cruise-control. This categorically does not mean trying to time the markets. What it does mean is trying to steer away from potential hazards along the way. Conclusion Keeping an eye on the key macro drivers is therefore key to asset allocation decision-making. Subscribe to our weekly newsletter to get all our insights to your inbox (for UK financial advisers only)
[5 min read, open as pdf]
With rate cuts less likely, and zombie-inflation proving sticky, there are dual pressures on long-dated gilts. Whilst for some it might be satisfying to blame higher UK bond yields on Rachel Reeves, comparisons to the "Truss moment" are not entirely fair. There is a difference in my view. Here's why: Truss yield spike: fear that UK books not balancing, disregarding OBR, not showing workings - only UK yields affected. Idiosyncratic UK bond market risk. Conclusion? Politicians ignoring how markets work. Reeves yield spike: fear that US and UK books not balancing PLUS US/UK debt issuance indigestion. US & UK yields simultaneously affected. Idiosyncratic UK AND Systematic US/UK bond market risk. Conclusion? Markets ignoring what polticians say. The Reeves era of yield pressure is different from the Truss/ moment of her 2022 budget. But that doesn't help. A review of bond duration and how to mitigate the risk of zombie inflation is required to cope with bond indigestion.
In our 2025 outlook, we explore our key themes for the year ahead
Subscribe to our weekly newsletter to get all our insights to your inbox (for UK financial advisers only) [5 min, read as pdf] Our 2024 Investment Review covers how the 2024 turned out relative to our Outlook. In our 2025 Investment Outlook we do not attempt to set target levels for market indices: level-specific forecasts are unhelpful and impossible to predict with certainty. Instead, we focus on the key themes that could characterise investment trends within and across asset classes and hence inform the decision-making for advisers’ investment committees we serve. The summary of our key themes for 2025 is set out below. America First: US exceptionalism to continue America First policy making will underpin US economic, earnings and market exceptionalism. US economic growth is outpacing the UK and EU. It benefits from higher energy prices and defence spending. American dominance of technology sector means its corporate earnings in aggregate have been more resilient, relative to the rest of world and the UK. Higher earnings growth has been rewarded with higher valuation multiples. Given the levels of market concentration, selectivity and balance within US equities remains key. US political and economic policy, and the performance of both its economy and its markets continue to define the global landscape. The newly-elected Republican government brings with it a strong mandate, emphasizing economic nationalism and trade protectionism. With a renewed "America First" policy framework, the outlook for US economic growth, corporate earnings and equity markets remain robust. The U.S. economy is expected to perform well in 2025, bolstered by domestic-focused policies and the competitive advantage it is afforded by an international trade environment that will be increasingly contested with Trump’s threatened tariff policy. The divergence between US and UK/European economic trajectories underscores this exceptionalism, with US economic and earnings growth accelerating while UK/European growth lags. Whilst the Russia-Ukraine war and related sanctions is bolstering the US Energy and Defence sectors, the remapping of European energy supply chains and resulting inflation for manufacturers is hollowing out European industry. The much-debated focus around lower UK equity market valuations is a function of lower UK corporate earnings growth, in our view. This has been the case both over the past decade, and looking forward. Without an accelerating growth trajectory or reason for a valuation re-rating, there is a risk that the relatively lower valuations for UK equities persists. We nonetheless recommend a low-moderate UK allocation as a useful diversifier, given the UK’s declining correlation with global markets. Dominance in technology has underpinned healthy corporate earnings in the US, relative to other regions. This earnings strength has supported higher valuation multiples for US equities. Combined with favourable interest rate dynamics, this has propelled market outperformance. Over the past decade, cumulative returns for US equities have materially outpaced global and UK markets, a trend likely to persist. We have to remain alert to anything that dislocate a richly-valued US equity market: agility from a sector and factor positioning perspective can be helpful in this respect. Debt indigestion: government debt is in fine balance Government debt is spiralling in the US and the UK. But with projected economic growth, aggregate debt levels remain (just) digestible. But any upgrade to borrowing or downgrade to growth could destabilise this fine balance and rattle the bonds market. Lower bond yields (higher bond values) mean more confidence in the bond market. Higher bond yields (lower bond values) mean less confidence in the bond market. The sustainability of government debt levels poses a significant challenge for both the US and UK. This combined, with new Governments and spending priorities increasing uncertainties. Rising interest rates have meant increased borrowing costs, putting pressure on fiscal balances. In both the UK and the US debt levels appear high in absolute times, but just manageable relative to GDP. However, any weakening in economic growth or fiscal indiscipline could destabilise this fine balance. These concerns have supported demand for gold and precious metals as Emerging Market Central Banks reduce exposure to the Dollar/US Treasury holdings. We will be monitoring new debt issuance carefully to see if the amount of government debt remains digestible without dislocating yields. Inflation: down but not dead “Zombie” inflation means it is down but not dead. Inflation is past its peak and settling at or above the 2% target which is now a “floor,” not a “cap”. Wage growth pressure, trade friction and energy market volatility means that inflation is down but not dead. Inflation has moderated from its peaks, but we believe it remains a very real risk. The 2% inflation target increasingly functions as a floor rather than a ceiling. Wage growth, energy volatility and geopolitical tensions could drive renewed inflationary pressures. To address this risk, portfolios should incorporate inflation-resilient asset classes, such as a tilt to yield within equities, and moderate exposure to liquid real assets, as well as short- to medium-term inflation-linked bonds. Asset Class Perspectives for 2025
Conclusion The three themes outlined above illustrate the forces shaping the investment landscape and asset class trends in 2025. As always, our approach emphasises an adaptive approach to navigate market risks. This does categorically mean trying to time the markets. But it does mean trying to avoid foreseeable harms along the way. Our granular asset-class recommendations are available to our clients. Henry Cobbe, CFA Head of Research, Elston Consulting For historical data, we use our own research and Bloomberg data.
For forward looking estimates used in strategic asset allocations, we use BlackRock Capital Market Assumptions for GBP investors, which we consider to be highly robust. For live market earnings, momentum, valuation, volatility, correlation and flows data to inform tactical asset allocation recommendations, we use proprietary research and Bloomberg data. [5 min read, read as pdf]
As we look forward to 2025, it is worth revisiting the themes and predictions of our 2024 outlook “turning the corner” to get a sense of what we anticipated at the time, how this informed our recommendations to UK adviser firms’ investment committees. Asset class performance for 2024 is summarised in the chart above. Our 2025 outlook is published separately. Subscribe to our weekly newsletter to get all our insights to your inbox (for UK financial advisers only) Steady as she slows In 2024, we anticipated a gradual deceleration in the U.S. economy, with markets pricing in the likelihood of a slight recession. In the event, the U.S. economy surprised on the upside. Growth forecasts were upgraded from 1.15% at the start of the year to an impressive 2.6% by year-end. This revision supported robust equity market returns and served as a reminder of the resilience of U.S. economic fundamentals. In summary, a resilient US economy defied expectations. What did we recommend to our clients at the outset and during the year? We took a balanced view between accepting concentration risk (traditional S&P 500) and diversified (active, sector exposures). We also recommended clients lean in to broader US equity corporate landscape via 1) Equal Weight and 2) US Small Caps exposures. By contrast, the UK had that shrinking feeling as regards economic growth, and although out of a technical recession, we are not confident of its prospects relative to the US. Pause before pivot At the close of 2023, we were focused on the Federal Reserve’s pause in interest rate hikes, noting that a rate cut was a question of when, not if. While the consensus view was that the first cut would be announced by mid-2024, we anticipated that the timing would hinge on the performance and strength of the U.S. economy. Indeed, the economy’s resilience delayed the start of what we anticipate to be a rate-cutting cycle to September 2024, when the Federal Reserve finally delivered a significant 50-basis-point cut. In fact, the eventual BoE Fed pivot came a month or two later than we had estimated at the start of the year, but we recommended our clients remain dynamic with regards to duration management. We recommended clients go strongly overweight duration in June as a good time to extend duration ahead of BoE cuts, with Fed following suit, and we saw the additional duration deliver returns on the bond side of the portfolio before attention shifted to debt supply and the UK budget later in the year, which led us to recommending to move back to neutral. The importance of portfolio resilience Our focus on resilience proved vital when it came to navigating the key macro factors in 2024: Growth, Inflation and Interest Rates. For Growth, anticipating a soft landing for the US economy, we highlighted the potential outperformance of cyclical sectors, and momentum, yield and size factors. In the event, momentum emerged as the best-performing factor, with yield and size also delivering strong returns. For Rates, we adjusted duration exposure mid-year to capture the effect of falling policy rates, aligning portfolios with a changing interest rate environment. For Inflation, which remained above target, the inclusion of liquid real assets (but to a lesser extent than in 2022) and shorter duration inflation-linked bonds, ensured continued portfolio resilience. We continue to emphasise the importance of a diversified alternatives exposure from a correlation perspective, not just in name. Our recommendation to consider Private Market Managers and Gold & Precious Metals paid off during the year – as these were the best performing asset classes for the year, outperforming world and US equities. Political and Geopolitical risks In a year of elections, we saw a change in government in the UK and in the US following Trump’s Presidential win. Both have a greater impact on bond yields and currency dynamics than equity markets, in our view. Geopolitical risks remain elevated with the Russia-Ukraine war continuing to grind, escalating conflict and contagion in the Middle East – all at tragic human cost. Conclusion Markets did indeed turn a corner in 2024, with economic growth, earnings and equity market returns outperforming expectations. With 2024 in the rear-view mirror, it’s time to look ahead to 2025. Our 2025 outlook is published separately. Henry Cobbe, CFA Head of Research, Elston Consulting |
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